Survival of the Hittest, Part 2
A lot can happen in 0.1 second

This is the second part of Survival of the Hittest. Part one can be read here.
Part 1 ended with the bat launching. By the time it starts turning toward the ball, the hitter has already done everything he can do before the swing: he has read what he can of the pitch, run through his waggle or held his bat still, and picked his moment. From there, a big league swing gets from launch to contact in about a tenth of a second, and a fastball covers the last fourteen feet to the plate in about the same amount of time. So the question for Part 2 is what a hitter can still do once he has committed. How much time can he win back if he started a little late? How does he handle a pitch that turns out slower than the one he started on? And the question that started this whole project in the first place: is he deciding when to start based on the pitch he sees, or the pitch he expects?
Time Is Not on Your Side
Start with the budget, because it is smaller than most people think. Say a hitter starts his swing a tenth of a second too late on a fastball. That is not a small miss; at 95 mph the ball travels about fourteen feet in that tenth of a second, which is the difference between meeting it out front and meeting it in the catcher's mitt. A late hitter has three ways to get some of that back, and none of them are free. He can swing harder, which buys roughly a hundredth of a second if he has anything left in the tank. He can shorten his path, taking a more direct route to the ball, which buys maybe two hundredths but costs him bat speed and lift. Or he can let the ball travel deeper and meet it closer to his body, which buys about a hundredth and a half but costs him the ability to pull it with any authority. Stack all three and a hitter can recover a few hundredths of a second. A tenth is a whiff.

Bat speed cuts both ways here, too. A faster bat lets a hitter start later and still get there, which is part of why the hitters who launch latest in Part 1 also swing a little harder. But a faster bat is also moving through the hitting zone faster, which gives it a narrower window to square the ball up. There is no setting on the swing that buys time for free.
The one lever everyone assumes works is the first one: if you are late, swing harder. In practice it does not save late swings. On fastballs where the bat met or passed the ball deepest, swings faster than a hitter's normal one whiffed about 41% of the time, against 37% for his normal swings and 27% for his slower ones. That is not proof that swinging harder causes misses (harder swings miss more in general), but there is no sign that the extra effort rescues a swing that started late. As we covered in Sandbagged, the hitters who keep the most in reserve are not using it as a late-swing emergency gear. They are choosing when to use it before the swing starts.
Midswing Crisis
So if a hitter cannot buy back much time once he has started, how does anybody hit a changeup? Soft stuff arrives about four to five hundredths of a second later than a fastball, which is a lot of extra time to account for in a swing that only lasts a tenth of a second from launch. You might expect hitters to handle that by waiting: see the slower pitch, start later. They do, but only a little.
Esmerlyn Valdez starts his swing only about a quarter of that extra time later on breaking balls and changeups than he does on fastballs. Aaron Judge, who reads the ball with a perfectly still bat, starts about 40% of the extra time later. Neither hitter waits for the slower pitch to catch up. Instead, they absorb the rest of the difference inside the swing itself. On breaking balls and changeups, both hitters take a longer path to the ball, roughly a foot longer than on fastballs, and they meet it much further out in front of the plate. Swing by swing, the more time a hitter has left after he starts, the longer his path and the further out front he makes contact. What does not change is how hard he swings. The slower pitch gets a longer swing, not a slower one.

This is also the other half of the whiff pattern from Part 1. Hitters miss breaking balls and changeups out in front for almost exactly this reason: they start only a little later than they would on a fastball, stretch the swing to cover the gap, and when the stretch is not enough, the bat gets to the spot before the ball does. And it is why being late on a fastball, as Part 1 showed with Valdez, happens during the swing rather than at the start of it. He starts on time; the swing just does not get there.
Guess Man
Which brings us to the question underneath all of this. When a hitter decides to start his swing, is he reacting to the pitch he sees, or to the pitch he expects?
The count makes this testable. A hitter knows that a 3-1 count is a fastball count and an 0-2 count is a breaking ball count, and he knows it before the pitcher ever starts his windup. So for each hitter I worked out how often he saw a fastball in every count, by pitcher handedness, and compared that to when he started his swing. A hitter who reacts to the pitch should start at about the same time in every count once you account for how fast the pitch is. A hitter who guesses should start earlier in counts where he expects a fastball, on every pitch type, before he can possibly know what is coming.
Valdez guesses. In counts where he usually sees fastballs, he starts earlier, by about six thousandths of a second for every ten points more fastball-likely the count is. Across the range of counts he sees, that adds up to about two hundredths of a second, which is bigger than the adjustment he makes to the pitch itself. Once the count and the pitch speed are accounted for, the type of pitch he actually got adds nothing. A fastball in a breaking ball count gets a later start from Valdez than a fastball in a fastball count, because he was expecting something else.
Judge reacts. His start time does not move with the count at all; it follows how fast the pitch is coming. So do Carlos Narváez and Matt McLain. Narváez is the most reactive hitter I observed, with a start that moves about twice as much with pitch speed as Valdez's or Judge's, which is a little surprising for the hitter with the busiest bat of anyone in Part 1. And then there is Taylor Trammell, who does neither. He starts at about the same moment on everything, barely adjusting for pitch speed at all (he absorbs only about 7% of the extra time on soft stuff in his start), and leaves every bit of the adjustment to the swing. He is not a guesser or a reactor. He is a metronome.

The part I find most interesting is that none of this lines up with the waggle. Narváez has the busiest bat of the group and reacts purely to the pitch. Trammell's bat is nearly as busy and he runs on a fixed clock. Valdez is busy and guesses. Judge holds the bat perfectly still and reacts. Whatever a hitter is doing with his bat before the pitch is a style, as Part 1 showed. How he sets his clock is a different decision entirely, and you cannot see it from the stands.
It also ties back to the budget. If a guess costs a hitter a couple hundredths of a second when it is wrong, that is inside what the swing can absorb: a longer path, a little deeper contact, a ball fouled off instead of squared up. A guess that is wrong by more than that is not. Expecting a breaking ball in an 0-2 count and getting a fastball up and in is exactly the kind of miss no swing can fix, and it is a miss that only a guesser can make.
So here is where the two parts leave us. The miss has a direction (late on fastballs, early on everything else), and the direction comes from how hitters handle time. The waggle is a personal clock, not a cause. The real start of the swing comes later than it looks and carries a trade between contact and power. Once the bat launches, a hitter has a few hundredths of a second to play with and no more, and he spends them on path and contact point rather than on swinging harder. And underneath all of it, hitters set their clocks in three different ways: by the count, by the ball, or not at all. The mechanics look similar from the outside. What separates hitters is less the swing than the clock they run it on.
The Short Version
Once the bat launches, a hitter can win back only a few hundredths of a second, by swinging harder, shortening his path or letting the ball travel. A tenth of a second late is a whiff.
Swinging harder does not rescue late swings. On the deepest fastball swings, harder-than-normal swings whiff more, not less.
On slower pitches, hitters start only a little later (about a quarter of the extra time for Valdez, about 40% for Judge) and absorb the rest with a longer path and contact further out front, which is why soft stuff is missed early.
Valdez guesses: he starts earlier in fastball counts on every pitch type. Judge, Narváez and McLain react to the pitch, and Trammell runs on a fixed clock.
How busy a hitter's bat is before the pitch tells you nothing about which kind of clock he runs.