Doctor Offseason and the Simulverse of Madness

We simulated the offseason 500 times

The Hot Stove Sacred Timeline

There is a scene in Avengers: Infinity War where Doctor Strange looks at 14,000,605 possible futures trying to find the one where they beat Thaons. It’s a great movie moment but for the rest of the characters none of them could see what he saw, and he refuses to explain himself. The baseball offseason has the same problem. Every winter there are thousands of ways the next four months could go: which options get picked up, who gets traded for prospects, which free agent ends up where and for how much. Every hot stove column is somebody looking at one of those futures and telling you it is the likely one. What I wanted to know is which moves show up in nearly all of the futures, the ones that happen no matter how the dice land, and what it is about those moves that makes them so stubborn.

I Will Walk Five Hundred Winters

The Team Builder on Baseball Hopper now plays out an entire offseason. It starts with every team's real 2027 projected roster and payroll, then runs the winter in order: option decisions and non-tenders first, then trades, then free agency, with asking prices dropping as the winter drags on and unsigned players get cheaper. Every team gets a plan for the winter (All in, Contend, Buy and sell, Quick rebuild, or Tank), and the plan sets how much it can spend, whether it sells veterans or buys them, how badly it wants to win a bidding war, and how much prospect capital it is willing to part with. An All in team will put together two or three trade packages for players it wants, a contender one or two, and everyone else is on the selling side. The best few teams with big payrolls go All in, the rest of the top ten contend, the bottom eight rebuild, and the bottom three tank.

The way a team decides on a player is simple on purpose. It asks how much he would improve its depth chart, measured in projected WAR (Wins Above Replacement, using Steamer's 2027 projections), multiplies that by how eager its plan makes it, and adds a small dose of luck so no two winters come out the same. Players come up one at a time, best first, and a team can only bid if it still has the money and the roster room when his turn comes. Contenders also plan ahead the way real front offices do: before the trade market opens, a contender that wants one of the true stars of free agency sets that money aside, and only trades with what is left. Every contract is a one-year deal, priced from what the FanGraphs crowd expects free agents to earn per season. Then we ran it 500 times, and for good measure we nudged every team's plan up a notch and down a notch and ran it again to see which moves held.

Wheeling Out Wheeler

The single most predictable move of the 2027 offseason is not a free agent signing at all. In all 500 simulated winters, the Phillies trade Zack Wheeler to the New York Yankees.

Wheeler is the first player on the trade block every winter. The Phillies are a Buy and sell team, he is in the last year of his deal at $42 million, and they move him every time. Ten teams are buying, and on day one four of them have enough payroll room to take on $42 million: the Yankees ($98 million of room), the Mets ($77 million), the Tigers ($48 million) and the Blue Jays ($42 million). But all four of those teams want Tarik Skubal, the best free agent on the market, and all four set aside roughly $41 million to make a run at him before the trade market even opens. Once that money is spoken for, the Mets have about $36 million left, the Tigers about $7 million and the Blue Jays about $1 million. The Yankees still have $57 million.

Wheeler goes to the Bronx every time because everyone else is saving up for Skubal. It is not that the Yankees need him most (the Tigers would gain more from him), it is that they are the only team still at the table. And here is the twist: almost none of those savings accounts pay off. The Yankees get Skubal in only 9 percent of winters, the Tigers in 3 percent, the Mets in 1 percent. Detroit spends the winter holding money for an ace it almost never signs, and ends up with Nick Lodolo and Janson Junk in trades plus whatever free agents are left when Skubal signs elsewhere (Seiya Suzuki or Brandon Woodruff, usually). The Phillies, meanwhile, take the $42 million they just cleared and sign Skubal themselves in 61 percent of winters.

Offseason Canon Events

Here is the full list of moves that happen in at least 89 percent of simulated winters.

What jumps out once you look at why each one happens is that very few of them are about a team needing a player more than anyone else. Most of them are about who is still standing when the player's turn comes. Call it a Last Chair move: the music stops, and the player ends up sitting with whichever team still has an open seat. Wheeler is the loudest example, and he is not alone.

Ozzie Albies to the Dodgers (95%): eagerness breaks the tie. The Braves put Albies on the block in the last year of his deal, and at $7 million he is the rare trade target nearly every contender can afford. Most of them would get his full value at second base, so on fit alone this should be a scramble. It is not, because the two All-In teams with room, the Dodgers and Yankees, want him about 20 percent more than the merely contending teams do, and by the time Albies comes up (11th on the trade block) the Yankees have taken on Wheeler and Joe Ryan and are down to about $6 million. When everyone fits a player, the most aggressive team with a hole and the money left wins him. The Dodgers' simulated winter is all infield: Albies, plus Isaac Paredes in nearly three out of four winters.

Joe Musgrove to the Mariners (91%): the last team standing. This is the purest Last Chair move on the list. On day one, Seattle is only the sixth-best fit for Musgrove among the buying teams, and Detroit would gain twice as much from him. But by the time the Padres shop him (seventh on the block), the Tigers and Blue Jays are holding their money for Skubal, the Mets are holding theirs too and have already spent prospect capital on Logan Webb, Cleveland has traded for Sandy Alcantara or Webb, Milwaukee has just spent $24 million on Nathan Eovaldi, and the Yankees have spent on Wheeler and Ryan. Seattle has not made a move and still has about $23 million.

Sometimes the team that sits out the early rush ends up with the best leftover. The Mariners' winter is mostly leftovers, in fact; they add catcher James McCann in about three out of four winters, too.

Nathan Eovaldi to the Brewers (89%): the contender that didn't save for Skubal. Eovaldi comes up just before Musgrove, at $24 million, and Milwaukee is only the fifth-best fit for him on day one, behind Detroit, the Mets, Cleveland and Toronto. Cleveland can't fit his salary, and the other three are all holding money for Skubal. Of the contenders with $24 million that isn't already spoken for, the Brewers need a starter the most, so they get him. Saving for a star changes more than where the star goes; it decides who gets the next tier of players, too.

Joe Ryan to the Yankees (89%): the rich get richer. Ryan is cheap ($9.1 million), good, and third on the trade block, right after Wheeler and Webb. The Yankees, after taking on Wheeler's salary, still have about $15 million and two more trade packages to spend, so they add Ryan too (and Jake Irvin in most winters as well). In the 11 percent of winters when they don't, Ryan goes to Detroit. The Yankees' whole offseason is the starting rotation, and it is mostly bought with money the rest of the league was saving.

Foster Griffin to the Twins (89%) and Michael King to the Orioles (91%): sell, then refill. These two go together. The Twins, a Buy and sell team, trade Joe Ryan in every single winter, which opens a rotation hole no other team in baseball has. Griffin, coming off a one-year, $5.5 million deal and 31 starts for Cleveland, fills it better than anyone: he adds about 2.4 wins to Minnesota's depth chart, and no other bidder gets more than 2.0. The Twins create the hole and then become the most motivated buyer in the market to fill it, at about $20.6 million, more than twice what Ryan was due. Griffin comes up in free agency just ahead of Michael King, who opted out of his Padres deal and is projected nearly as well. Once Minnesota has Griffin, the best fit left for King is Baltimore (about 2.4 wins), and the Orioles sign him in 91 percent of winters at about $19.8 million. Two similar starters, two teams, the same split almost every time, decided by which one hit the market first.

There are also a handful of moves that happen in every one of the 500 winters, because the option and non-tender decisions involve no luck at all. Cleveland declines Emmanuel Clase's option (for reasons), and Gavin Sheets (San Diego), Camilo Doval (San Francisco), Spencer Steer (Cincinnati), Matt Vierling (Detroit) and Josh Lowe (the Angels) are all non-tendered, every time. In the simulation's eyes these are not decisions so much as arithmetic: the projected salary is more than the projected wins are worth to that team's plan.

The Bell of the Sku-ball

The sure things are the exception. The typical top-40 free agent lands with his most likely team only about 38 percent of the time, which is another way of saying that most of this winter is genuinely up for grabs. The best example is the best player.

Tarik Skubal, at roughly $41 million for one year, signs with the Phillies in 61 percent of winters and the Blue Jays in 26 percent, with the Yankees, Tigers and Mets splitting the rest. (The Cubs, who have reportedly bowed out, are left out of the bidding here too.) Six teams bid on him every single winter, but the Phillies get the most out of him (about 5.5 wins) and the Blue Jays, as a contender, are eager enough to stay close (4.4 wins). It is a fragile split, though: move the Phillies' plan one notch in either direction and Skubal goes to Toronto most of the time.

What about the Mets, who on paper look like the obvious next team? They do save the money for him, but in our simulations before the free agency market develops they have traded for a starter (Logan Webb in 69 percent of winters, Sandy Alcantara in 30 percent), and once that rotation spot is filled, Skubal adds less to the Mets (about 3.6 wins) than to Philadelphia or Toronto. The Mets keep the money and lose the need. That is a real tradeoff a front office has to make, and the simulation suggests it is the difference between being the favorite and being the fifth choice.

The middle class of free agency is even fuzzier. Brady Singer goes to Miami in about half of winters, with Washington or Kansas City picking up most of the rest; Luis Robert Jr. is a near coin flip between Pittsburgh (34 percent) and the A's (33 percent). And on the trade market, Michael Wacha is the first call for almost any team that decides to start buying: if the Cardinals move up to Contend, they land him in 92 percent of winters; the White Sox, 90 percent; the Astros, 88 percent. A team's first move as a buyer is almost always the best cheap player still on the board.

It Takes Two to Trade

The last thing the simulation shows is the one I keep coming back to. If you push every team in baseball one notch more aggressive, the trade market almost disappears, from about fifteen trades in a typical simulated winter to five, wfich makes sense once you see it; The sellers have all become buyers, and there is nobody left to buy from. Push every team one notch more cautious, and the trade market also almost disappears, down to 6, because now the buyers have all become sellers.

Free agent prices move the way you would expect (about $8.2 million per win when everyone is aggressive, $7.0 million when everyone is cautious, $7.6 million as things stand), but the trade market only works when teams disagree about whether 2027 is worth chasing. The hot stove needs some front offices to give up on next year so that the rest of the league can get better. It also explains which teams matter most. When the Astros or Cubs slide from “Buy and Sell” to “Quick Rebuild”, more than 50 players end up somewhere different, because a new seller floods the market. When the Dodgers or Red Sox dial back, a dozen or fewer do. The one big-market exception is the Yankees (45 players), because so much of the winter runs through the money they have left after everyone else saves for Skubal.

A few limits belong in any multiverse report, and the biggest one is the size of the multiverse. Five hundred winters sounds like a lot until you count what could happen. Not one of our 500 simulated offseasons repeated another, and if you multiply out the different landing spots for every player who changed teams in them, you get a number more than 100 digits long. Plenty of those combinations are impossible (nobody can sign everyone), but even after throwing most of them out, our 500 winters cover a fraction of the possibilities with a long string of zeros after the decimal point. The simulation also has blind spots of its own: every contract is one year long, real front offices don’t take turns in order of projected WAR, and none of this knows about the conversations that have already happened. Five hundred runs is enough to tell the sturdy moves from the wobbly ones, but nowhere near enough to map every branch.

The futures we did see also hang together more delicately than the percentages let on. Skubal to Philadelphia is the favorite at 61 percent, but every one of those futures starts with the Phillies trading Wheeler. If Phillies keep Wheeler instead, Skubal never becomes a Phillie; He signs with Toronto (78 percent) or Detroit (21 percent), the Yankees take the money they would have spent on Wheeler and trade for Manny Machado, Joe Ryan goes to the Tigers in 98 percent of winters instead of the Bronx, and 48 of the 72 players worth at least a win who change teams end up somewhere different. (The sturdy moves get even sturdier: Albies, Musgrove, Griffin and Eovaldi all become more likely.) One decision in Philadelphia rewrites two thirds of the winter. In Loki, the TVA calls a moment like that a nexus event, a single choice that sends the timeline branching off in a new direction, and this offseason is full of them. The simulation can’t see every branch, but it does know where the money and the roster holes are, and somewhere on a front office desk, the next nexus event is already waiting.

The Short Version

  1. The most predictable move of the 2027 offseason is Zack Wheeler going from the Phillies to the Yankees, in all 500 simulated winters, because every other team that could afford him is saving its money for Tarik Skubal.

  2. Very few of the surest moves are about one team needing a player most. Most are Last Chair moves: the player ends up with whoever still has money and room when his turn comes (Wheeler to New York, Musgrove to Seattle, Eovaldi to Milwaukee).

  3. Saving for a star reshapes the whole market. The teams that hold money for Skubal rarely get him (the Yankees 9 percent, the Tigers 3, the Mets 1), and their caution decides where Wheeler, Musgrove and Eovaldi go.

  4. Sellers become the most motivated buyers. The Twins trade Joe Ryan and then sign Foster Griffin to replace him, which leaves Michael King for the Orioles.

  5. Skubal is the Phillies’ to lose (61 percent), with Toronto next (26 percent). The Mets save the money but fill their rotation by trade first, and lose the need.

  6. The trade market needs disagreement. Make every team more aggressive, or every team more cautious, and trades fall from 15 a winter to 5 or 6.

  7. Even 500 winters barely scratch the surface. No two of them were alike, and the possible offseasons number more than 100 digits. The futures hinge on nexus events: if the Phillies keep Wheeler, Skubal goes to Toronto or Detroit instead and two thirds of the winter’s notable moves change.

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